Forge Protocol Security Assessment
Report identification
| Field | Assessed record |
|---|---|
| Report ID | FORGE-SEC-2026-11-21 |
| Assessment date | 21 November 2026 UTC |
| System | The Forge application and hpFLR operating suite on Flare mainnet |
| Network | Flare C-chain, chain ID 14, with native P-chain staking |
| Assessed state | Current production code, application build, installed operating roles and deployed contract identities |
| Reviewer participant | Jon-Sn0w, project owner, using Codex Daybreak Blue |
| Opinion | PASS - no confirmed open findings in the assessed production scope |
Executive opinion
The assessment examined the current Flare mainnet production implementation across first-party contracts, the application, operating services, signing controls and external dependency boundaries. The review traced value and authority from wallet action through contract execution, native staking, reward calculation, proof publication, claims, swap routing and operational recovery. The retained workpaper and supplemental records give an individual disposition for each identified item in scope. No confirmed security finding remains open at the assessment cut-off.
The review combined source inspection, adversarial execution, cross-module accounting checks, installed service and publication identity, and read-only mainnet observation. A private-node check at block 75,062,481 matched all 84 in-scope contract-address runtimes to the recorded identities. The same check included three additional deployed addresses outside the current execution path; all 87 hashes matched. The global operational switch was paused at the recorded operating-state observation. A PASS is an evidence-based audit opinion for that state, not a guarantee about future transactions or upgrades.
1. Scope and inventory reconciliation
The reviewed scope is the current Flare mainnet production path. It was determined from the deployed contract graph, current application publication, effective installed service units, configured chain and contract bindings, and actual consumer reachability. A running process was not counted merely because it was active in systemd.
| Reviewed class | Reconciliation basis |
|---|---|
| Contract addresses | Forge production and authority addresses across executable families and bound external dependencies |
| Operating services | Application roles and alert signing |
| Restricted signer transports | Current custody and reward signing links |
| Pages Function modules | Current routes, middleware and shared request handlers |
| Published browser JavaScript assets | Wallet, swap, claim, provider, configuration and supporting assets |
| Custody Go source files | Threshold ceremony, policy, signing, transport, storage and settlement |
| Discovered dependencies and namespaces | External factory/quoter endpoints, reachable router, Multicall3, dynamic pool namespace and local mail handoff |
The 35 executable contract families reviewed are:
| Family | Assessed contracts |
|---|---|
| hpFLR principal and staking | HpFLR, VaultOperational, RedemptionQueue, StakeOperationsController, ValidatorStrategyPolicy, OperationalSwitch |
| Holder and network rewards | HolderRewardLedger, MirrorRewardDistributor, StakeLotRewardDistributor, RewardRootQuorum, RewardDeliveryRouter, ValidatorClaimRouter, EligiblePositionRegistry, RecipientRegistry |
| Forge pools and routing | Pair, PairFees, PairFactory, PairGenerator, RouterV2, ForgeLPVault, WFLRDelegationManager, FTSOYieldDistributor, FTSOPriceOracle, NetworkSwapExecutor, DataProviderRegistry, ForgePairGovernance |
| Administration and upgrade | GovernedTransparentProxy, NetworkSwapExecutorProxy, ProxyAdmin, NetworkSwapExecutorProxyAdmin, UpgradeableBeacon, BeaconProxy, InterimUpgradeAuthority, HpTimelock |
| Distinct deployed compiler profile | StakeOperationsController operational implementation profile |
Every repeated deployed address was checked separately for runtime identity and applicable implementation, beacon, proxy administrator, owner and role bindings. Source-family review did not replace address-specific reconciliation. The complete address register and review for every item are in the retained workpaper; the public production manifest identifies deployed contract addresses.
The reviewed service instances comprise production staking roles; production materializer, MIRROR claimant and proof publisher, reward calculator, epoch executor, root poster, stake proof publisher and reward proposer; Flare and reward health monitors; gas funder; LP-yield and optional reward-delivery workers; Forge quote and token-volume services; independent health; and the DKIM alert signer. Current restricted signing transports were checked across independent infrastructure. Installed executable identity, effective unit overrides, mode, configuration and current contract bindings were reconciled for each role.
The 31 Pages Function files and 41 published browser assets were reviewed for their production responsibilities. The security-sensitive paths include wallet selection and account switching, chain and contract binding, transaction simulation, quote execution, reward proofs, cumulative claims, redemption, provider data, and safe DOM rendering. The 21 custody Go source files cover distributed ceremony, activation, approval, historical state, host transport, policy locking, signing rounds, transaction reservation, storage and settlement. Passive browser assets were recorded separately from transaction-capable code. The review also traced service-spawned staking and custody modules and their import closure, rather than stopping at systemd entrypoints.
2. Review method and control results
| Production path | Specific controls examined | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit, Vault and FIFO redemption | Exact 1:1 principal issue and burn, recognized asset coverage, reward reserve separation, oldest-first allocation, partial funding, failed-payment rollback and returned-liquidity priority | PASS |
| Native delegation and rollover | Approved provider and term, exact lot identity, available reserve after FIFO, canonical C/P observations, threshold typed controller approval, journal recovery and no discretionary relayer authority | PASS |
| Distributed custody | Independently held encrypted shares, individual policy checks, authenticated and loopback-restricted rounds, nonce and signed-byte binding, session reservation, canonical settlement and share-epoch replacement | PASS |
| MIRROR and stake-lot rewards | Official funded receipts, lot and mirror evidence, three historical balance checkpoints, registered LP and vault attribution, reproducible allocations, quorum-bound roots and funded caps | PASS |
| Cumulative claims and optional delivery | One cumulative holder balance, source claim replay prevention, explicit owner consent, revocation, exact gas/net accounting, threshold signing and failed-claim rollback | PASS |
| Forge pool and LP yield | Factory and pair identity, 30-basis-point LP fee custody, guarded stable-pair invariant and FTSO input, vault share accounting, delegation harvest authority and worker failure reporting | PASS |
| Aggregator and swap | Canonical private-node catalog, authenticated quote gateway, bounded route search, factory-bound venues, token and callback continuity, exact input and minimum output, wallet preflight and simulation | PASS |
| Pages and browser | Read-only public API boundary, bounded requests, published asset identity, Flare-only wallet configuration, selected-account handling, provider/logo validation and no private RPC or signer material in browser output | PASS |
| Gas, health and alerting | Recipient and global funding budgets, reserve and gas-price policy, durable intents, scheduled-result and checkpoint monitoring, local SMTP handoff and DKIM signing | PASS |
| Pause, roles and upgrades | Operational switch, exact proxy and implementation binding, controller and quorum roles, interim direct authority, timelock, and explicit administrator forfeiture | PASS with disclosed authority |
The reward allocation calculation uses historical state from the private full-history node and publishes a reproducible artifact. The root quorum and contracts validate authorization, proof membership and funding bounds. They do not recalculate every economic entitlement on chain. The historical calculation and its independent reproduction are material controls in the reviewed design.
The pool and LP vault are registered economic positions in both holder reward streams. Historical hpFLR held by the pair is attributed to LP owners; LP deposited in the vault follows vault-share ownership. Structural pair and vault addresses are not direct reward recipients. Pool swap fees and WFLR delegation yield are separate from MIRROR and stake-lot holder rewards.
3. Findings and disposition
| Severity | Confirmed open findings |
|---|---|
| Critical | 0 |
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
No production source defect was confirmed in the assessed current-mainnet scope. The findings table reports confirmed open security findings at the assessment cut-off; disclosed administrative authority and external dependencies are described separately below.
The interim administrator and quorum participants retain the powers deliberately assigned to them. That is a disclosed authority model, not an unresolved finding. The administrator's upgrade power can be permanently forfeited when the owner chooses to do so; it had not been forfeited at the assessed standby checkpoint.
4. Verification record
| Evidence | Result |
|---|---|
| Current mainnet runtime identity | Private-node read at block 75,062,481: 87 recorded runtime hashes matched, including all 84 in-scope addresses; 0 mismatches |
| First-party contract execution | Forge DEX focused Hardhat tests: 83 passed. hpFLR applicable Foundry tests: 496 passed across Vault, redemption, operations and rewards |
| Browser, Pages and workers | Focused wallet, swap, quote, reward, materializer, gas, LP-yield, staking and health suites passed; production Pages verification matched the pinned application assets and Functions inputs |
| Custody Go | Go 1.26.11 package suite passed; eight command packages compiled; all 21 current non-test source files were included in review |
| External route identity | Eleven factory/quoter endpoints, the reachable BlazeSwap router and Multicall3 had nonempty code at finalized block 75,020,619; the reachable router hash matched the browser pin |
| Installed services | Current service instances and restricted peer links reconciled to effective units and production bindings; gas policy checked against source enforcement |
| Publication and private node | Browser and Pages assets tied to the production manifest; historical reads use the private full-history node, while public wallet reads do not reveal its endpoint |
Tests demonstrate the stated invariants in their fixtures; deployed-identity and installed-source comparisons are separate evidence. The private runtime read was observational and sent no transaction. The report does not infer an earned staking reward, holder payment or P-chain stake from a scheduled worker pass.
5. Material trust and operating boundaries
- Administration: Interim direct administration and the short governance timelock remain active until changed or forfeited on chain. Authorized changes can alter future behavior.
- Allocation publication: Off-chain historical calculation and allocation-root selection are necessary parts of the current cross-chain reward design. On-chain checks bind quorum, proof, replay and actual funded value; reproducible source data supports independent verification.
- Threshold signing: Operational authorities use independently located runners with encrypted shares and independent operation policies. An individual runner cannot reconstruct the private key or authorize a threshold signature alone.
- External code: Flare consensus, validators, token and DEX implementations, dynamic external pools, the private node, OpenDKIM and Postfix are dependencies. Their exact integration identities and containment controls were reviewed; their internal code is not represented as first-party audited source.
- Alert delivery: Local Postfix queuing and DKIM signing were checked. Delivery beyond the local mail boundary depends on external mail systems.
6. Evidence register
| Ref | Record |
|---|---|
| E-01 | Owner-retained Daybreak Blue itemized workpaper, schema forge.daybreak.full-production-audit.v2, SHA-256 8505aa65e767746e93737a3a899b39bd9edf4f1d859a8b50282a8bd3c098c0dd |
| E-02 | Owner-retained private-node runtime capture at Flare block 75,062,481, with 87 matching recorded hashes |
| E-03 | production/audit/MAINNET-ACTIVE-CONTRACT-CHECKLIST.md and production/audit/MAINNET-CONTRACT-RECONCILIATION.json |
| E-04 | production/flare-mainnet-current.json and production/release-manifest.json |
| E-05 | Focused contract, browser, Pages, custody, worker and health test results recorded in the workpaper and supplemental records indexed by E-07 |
| E-06 | Effective installed unit, signer transport, gas policy and DKIM/Postfix captures recorded in the workpaper and supplemental records indexed by E-07 |
| E-07 | Owner-retained assessment evidence index, SHA-256 00d7e41e45fa5e9abf1656fc1f37440466d56b0f4971350de87ed1da5ff7e593, binds the workpaper and supplemental source, entrypoint, timer and Pages coverage records |
The detailed workpaper and protected host captures are retained by the owner. They are not bundled into the public application because they contain operational topology. The public report gives the scope, method, disposition and stable workpaper hash needed to identify the assessed record.
Final opinion
PASS - no confirmed open security finding in the assessed Flare mainnet production code and paused operating suite. This opinion applies to the identified code and operating bindings at the assessment cut-off. It does not establish the outcome of future upgrades, configuration changes or network events.
Reviewer participant: Jon-Sn0w, project owner, using Codex Daybreak Blue.
Report date: 21 November 2026 UTC.
Report ID: FORGE-SEC-2026-11-21.